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Ron Fisher
Professor of International Peace and Conflict Resolution, School of International Service, American UniversityTopics: track I - track II cooperation, trust building, rebuilding relationships, complexity, peace processes
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Q: The first question that I ask everybody is, will you please give me an
overview of your work?
A: Well that's a tough question. I have been at it... I published the first
article on conflict resolution in the journal in 1972. From that there has been
a string of scholarly publications which generally focus on what I call
interactive conflict resolution, dialogue, problem solving, unofficial small
group kinds of work that we hope that supports official processes, but supports
peace building in general. That's the one side of it. The other side of it is as
a practitioner, it would be in two domains.
One would be in conflict resolution training. I first started offering
training workshops mostly on interpersonal conflict in organizational settings
in the mid- 1970s and have continued to do that ever since. More into the
late 80s and early 90s I was kind of part of the first wave of conflict
resolution practitioners who went international. I had always been interested in
the international community. My PhD was actually completed with a minor in
international relations. That was the period during which we took a lot of the
concepts and the skills we worked with in domestic conflict resolution training
and took the wider field; for me especially focusing on ethno political conflict
at the international level. That's probably about it. The two areas: scholar and
practitioner.
The other thing I guess that I have done is a lot of work in graduate
programs. In fact the last five years has been focusing on looking at graduate
programs looking at conflict resolution, helping them design them, helping them
to develop them and now here at American basically as a faculty member
continuing that implementation.
Q: I wanted to ask you some questions about the contingency model
that you developed a few years back. I wonder if maybe first we should start out
with a brief description, it doesn't have to be detailed, but just to sort of
give a little context. And then I am going to ask you some specific questions
about applicability and such.
A: Well, interestingly enough in relation to this project it was intractable
ethno political conflict, which was my primary concern, and has been the primary
concern of a lot of people in the field. Our sense was that the traditional
methods of conflict management were not only ineffective but in some ways may be
making things worse.
For example, there are two sides in an intractable conflict that negotiate
with a lot of frustration and failure. What they have done to each other in the
negotiations becomes another issue in the intractable conflict. I have worked a
lot on Cyprus and it is a very good example of that. The intention was to see if
there was some way that through a combination of different third party
interventions, some tend to come more from the official domain and some from
unofficial, we might better be able to effectively address intractable violent
conflict. The idea was that we might be able to deescalate it with some methods
to a point where it is more amiable to other methods. Through this coordinated
sequencing of interventions that should be more effective then we were being. So
that was the essence of the intention anyway.
Q: And within that model, if I understand it correctly, there are situations
where it is more appropriate to have more softer sides of interventions, like
consultation or conciliation, where you are looking to find some common
interest, and to get some mutual understanding. And then sort of follow into
hard line negotiating, mediation, more traditional bargaining type of stuff. My
question when I read that is, and listening to your previous answer, what does
that actually look like on the ground? Maybe you can contextualize that for me
with an example. Also the word "coordination" is tricky because who
coordinates how and when and how does the sequencing come and how do you
identify the right parts?
A: Well those are very good questions for a lot of reasons, getting at the
heart of what we mean by contingency and what goes into it. I think the best way
to answer that fairly briefly is that one area of the contingency model really
focuses on pre-negotiation work and that is where the softer, unofficial stuff
has demonstrated its utility in helping to shift the parties toward serious
negotiation. Hopefully being more successful when they get there because what
has transferred from the unofficial side. Now that actually happens in two ways.
A lot of people are critical of working at the elite level because they say
that it is only part of the picture. It is a central part of the picture; it is
integral. Some transfer from a lot of unofficial conflict resolution and peace
building work also needs to make its way to radiate in to the public domain,
opinion, media, education, you know the whole bit. I don't want to deny that you
need both of those levels and all of the ones in between for success but just to
give you one example looking at the work of Hal Sanders and Randa Slim and their
other American and Russian colleagues on the civil war in Tajikistan, starting
the inter Tajik dialogue before the negotiations were even there before the
parties would even talk to each other so they are working unofficially outside
of the country bringing together unofficial representatives of the government
and the opposition parties and factions, and paving the way toward negotiation.
Q: ...these are fairly influential people?
A: These are quite high-level people, in fact as the situation progressed and
the negotiation started some of the people in the informal dialogue actually
became negotiators. Some were already advisors to the president and to the
leader of the opposition and so on. So that you know you are going to get
transfer in a number of ways. Again, Hal and his colleagues have documented
that work adequately enough to demonstrate the power of contingency, thinking at
least in a pre-negotiation way.
Q: I feel like the terms dialogue and negotiation get confused. The
purpose of this dialogue was to not come to any formal agreement or to start
negotiating tactics or strategies that would lead to the end of the conflict?
A: It wasn't at all for those purposes, although it was dialogue in the
deeper sense of conflict analysis. It starts to raise options that would be
useful for the official track and the over all peace process. Dialogue and
problem solving workshops are not to be confused with negotiating sessions where
official people sit down and hammer out the nuts and bolts of "what is our
agreement" and "what are the domains that it has to be done." As
Hal points out, and everyone knows, only official policy makers, decision
makers, representatives can and will do that.
What they were able to do is first of all build some understanding between
the two sides, and to start to build a bit of working trust that they could
actually work together. Have each of them realize that there was a legitimate
and reasonable negotiating partner on the other side. Out of that they produced
a memorandum on negotiation, which identified what they thought were the major
issues. One big one was being the return of refugees. That time gave a lot of
direction to the official negotiating process. So it is setting the stage, but
it is not walking on the stage and doing the deal. That's not our business, it
never has been. It shouldn't be, then we are confusing things. We are getting
into roles where we don't have the mandate or the responsibility to do it.
Q: What about the questioning of sequencing and coordination? That's a great
example in a sort of linear sense where first their was the pre-negotiation
dialogues, the negotiation dialogues, and then the actual Track I work. What
about something like Sri Lanka or maybe even Cyprus where over such a long
period so many different things have been tried, where do you start again?
A: Well, again that's a good question. The contingency model as it is laid
out is a simple linear sequence just to get the logic and the rational there. It
is much too simplistic because there is recycling, there can be recycling I am
sure with in it, but also some people make the good point in these very complex
intractable conflicts that rather than sequentially you should have
simultaneous. A lot of things can happen at the same time, and be useful and
cross-fertilize and so on.
I wouldn't argue with that part of the reason for the contingency model was
wanting to find a conceptual place where there was an opportunity for the softer
unofficial methods of conflict resolution to be involved and respected. You have
to understand that part of the development of this whole field has been a small
people political battle with those of us working in the unofficial domain
looking to get some credibility and visibility from those in the official
domain; or their supporters, if you will. Part of it has been convincing
realists in international relations, as well as policy makers and government
that we have something valuable to offer in a complementary way. I think it's a
good model in its own conceptual right but it also had a political motivation.
Q: Can we talk about Cyprus? Maybe you can contextualize all of this
stuff with the very specific actions that you have had in Cyprus. If you could
maybe draw for me the sort of 20 year picture of your involvement with the
conflict in Cyprus, and its attempt at resolution.
A: I wish I could give you a clear, compelling picture of success as I think
we can with Tajikistan for example. I usually say that I have been has been as
successful in my work in Cyprus as everyone else who has worked in Cyprus, which
means that we haven't gotten to a peace agreement or a renewed relationship and
so on.
It has been frustrating because I faced many of the resistances and
limitations, particularly around difficulty in acquiring funding that a lot of
people have in the conflict resolution field; partly because of political
events, and partly because of changing priorities among funding organizations
and so on. I actually started the work out of a semi-official institute in
Canada that was government funded, and fairly well funded. After the initial
series of seminars and then some conflict analysis workshops, one of which was
with quite high-level influentials from the two sides, the institute was axed in
a budget-cutting move by the Canadian government. I was able to do a couple
more workshops in a research fund but some of the budget for the institute went
into the Department of Foreign Affairs.
In the early going that fund wouldn't look at work unofficially that was too
close to the political action, so I had to go and work in the educational field.
I brought a number of people into that, including Louis Diamond from IMTD. It
was about that point that fund was axed as well, that IMTD, in concert, first
of all with NTL Institute of Applied Behavioral Science and then Roger Fisher's
Conflict Management Group started a training program that went on for several
years, and I was involved in that as a trainer on a number of the projects,
especially the track that trained trainers in conflict resolution. Essentially
what we were able to do when other players came in the later stages to that, Ben
Broom for example, doing training in interactive management techniques, we were
able to create a constituency for peace. They were there before we were able
them nurture them but give them a lot of concepts and skills that
they could use both in their communities, but across the line to build a peace
constituency in Cyprus.
Following that, as I mentioned before we started the interview, was the
intractability project, which was used for analysis and then the study group. It
had some direct transfer over to the official talks resulting in the so called,
"Annan Plan," the latest plan for peace, which unfortunately one side
rejected. The side that rejected it, North Cyprus, experienced the most
significant outcry of public opinion for peace in the history of the island.
There were a number of demonstrations where between 50,000 and 75,000 Turkish
Cypriots, out of a total population of less than 200,000, were in the streets
agitating and advocating for this peace plan to be used as the basis for a deal.
The current president who has been the negotiator for thirty some years took it
upon himself to ignore that statement of public opinion and said,
"decisions aren't made in the street." You can understand that
sentiment, but at the same time he now seems to be more and more isolated. There
are elections in December that will probably bring opposition parties to power
who will in fact sign that deal. I hope that happens.
All of that is to say I remember in my first trip to Cyprus in early 1990 and
one of the people I met with of several was one of the main organizers of those
demonstrations. We supported the peace community by giving them what they
wanted. What they wanted was conflict resolution training, they now are doing it
in Cyprus. They have been doing it in their own community across the line with a
lot of frustration, because in 1997 the regime in North Cyprus shut down the
Green Line and basically stopped all inter-communal work. At that time I had
money available from Foreign Affairs Canada to restart my workshop series and my
conflict analysis series. Of course when one side says there is no more of that,
they backed off and wouldn't support it.
It has been a continuing series of frustrations for me and everybody else,
but over 10-15 years a lot of work has been done which (keeping our fingers
crossed) might support the peace deal. Then there will be people on both sides
who are well equipped to rebuild the relationship. So I guess in that sense it
has been a success story, but it hasn't culminated in a renewed relationship
between the two former enemies.
Q: It sounds like the reality of that situation is sufficiently
messy to hypothesize a little bit about how the contingency model now would look like
in an ideal situation assuming funding, lets just live in an imaginary world for
a second, and assume there is sufficient funding to take on various projects.
Where, then, would you would the contingency model suggest that we start dealing with
the issues now as they stand in Cyprus?
A: It would probably suggest that even with formal negotiations starting on
the basis of the plan there are still relationship issues, and difficulties
being encountered bringing about a full sustainable peace. So one direction work
needs to go now is in reconciliation. There has been very little reconciliation
in Cyprus even with recently tens of thousands of people going back and forth
across the Green Line, which was opened up; which is a wonderful thing. Those
are kind of like harmonious visits for a day.
That's not quite the same as the two communities reintegrating and living
together. There are still a lot of fears out of the past from the atrocities,
lack of trust, and so on. There is a lot of relationship work to be done,
complimentary to para-negotiation rather then pre-negotiation. We need to use a
para-negotiation fashion to support the rebuilding of the relationship between
the two peoples. Also they have been separate since 1974-75 so it is also a
matter for a lot of younger people who have these myths, and in some cases
stereotypes of the other sides. The relationship needs to be re-humanized. That
can be done in small group dialogues and reconciliation work.
It also has to be done at the public level through the media, through events,
and through public apologies. They are very well aware of that need of all kinds
of things to be carried forward. The contingency would continue to say there are
complimentary activities that support the negotiation process. You have to
understand that is a simple initial model that really is geared to deescalating
the conflict so that negotiations can eventually be successful. It doesn't
really deal with rebuilding peace and the whole fabric of society, it wasn't
intended to. Even though that obviously has to done.
Q: In the beginning of your answer sounded like reconciliation is
almost the end piece of the contingency model so that there are the softer
aspects of conflict resolution both before the Track I negotiations and
afterwards. You are saying now that reconciliation is really not accounted for
in the contingency model that comes later it may not always be necessary but something that is contained in that.
A: No. Not essential when you talk about improving the relationship. In the
contingency model you are talking about reconciliation as part of that, but at
the higher level of escalation and stalemate, I don't think the contingency
model did justice to starting the reconciliation at that point, to be able to
move back to a relationship where the two parties can, communities basically, deal
with their problem and live together.
Q: I understand there is a new book coming out on intractable conflict that
you are entered in with some other people.
A: That's right in fact the new book is called "Paving the Way: Contributions
of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peace Making," and in addition to the
Tajikistan case there are seven other chapters by leading figures in the field.
Some of the contributors are practitioners, scholar/practitioners, some are
researchers who have looked at the work and written up the case.
It basically is to document the power of unofficial soft work in moving out
of intractability because all of these are intractable conflicts that it deals
with. The chapters in the book are in a sense limited to the pre-negotiation to
negotiation part of the contingency model. Not all of the cases are full
successes, yet some are just hanging on the edge but the contributions are
apparent. If and when it happens then you will be able to say well it seems it
was because of that. The other thing that is added to the book is that I am
using a research method called comparative case analysis to look at common
elements in the conflicts and in the interventions that seem to be related to
successful transfer. This is the first empirical demonstration other than a case
a here and a case there that unofficial conflict resolution work seems to have
some power to influence all different outcomes.
Q: Can you talk about some of those commonalities now, or would you
rather wait till that all comes around?
A: Well I haven't done the analysis. I can tell you what I think just out of
experience some are obvious and maybe some are not so obvious. The proof will be
in the analysis. I may find that there are no commonalities. That is what
science is about.
Q: Well one of the questions that I ask just about everybody is about
techniques and methods that are more useful than others, sort of a search of
best practices. Do you have any thoughts on that?
A: I just finished reading some parts of the final report of the Reflecting
Peace Practices Project which I think is really great work, but it does try and
cover such a broad range of activities in peace building. Conflict resolution is
only a slice of that, and it is not always clear how big a slice it is or how it
is a slice. Partly in relation to that work and it makes these comments, similar
comments, but to the field as a whole is that there has been so much profusion
and diffusion of conflict resolution, peace building, development, and human
rights activities going on. It is really hard to get your mind around what is
happening out there. What is effective work? What isn't? How is conflict
resolution being adapted and applied as we in the field understand it?
I am really quite concerned that there is a danger of losing the integrity
and the focus of conflict resolution work in all of this activity, in much of
what sounds good and is designed to do good work, get funding, interest donors,
to help clients and so on. We may be losing what is really important around
intractable conflict, which is to help parties with moving out of the conflict.
You see a capacity building, good governance, peace building, all kinds of
things going on as projects. There is a little slice of conflict resolution and
you are saying well that is good work that could be done in any society any
time. What is actually really relevant to de-escalating the conflict, to healing
the wounds, to reconciliation, to getting peace on track? What is the focus
here? What is the integrity of what we have to offer? I am a little bit
concerned with that.
I think what we need to do is redouble our efforts to identify what conflict
resolution practice involves whether it is dialogue, analysis, training, or
problem solving where it seems to fit with some of these other domains. It is
interesting to look at what we as practitioners in the field can and should do,
and what we can and shouldn't do. I make the comment and I think it is accurate.
A lot of what is called peace building is really community development in
somebody else's country. It is now going international but we will call it peace
building because it is in an area where conflict was, but it may or may not
really help in resolving that conflict in that country, which is what needs to
happen for it to get back on the track to development. There is a lot of
confusion out there and people are becoming aware of this and some people are
starting to trying to address a conceptual way, its really a complex morass,
because there is so much going on in what are already very complex situations.
It kind of boggles the mind. It is a big issue.
Q: So what is your view of what conflict resolution does bring?
A: I think it brings some of those elements I just mentioned. I think it
brings dialogue, which is in other fields as well. I don't want to get
proprietary here and take over things. Also it certainly brings conflict
analysis and problem solving. It was at the beginning of the field, especially
when it shifted internationally, if you want to deal with a conflict situation
you don't just bash into negotiation, you need some diagnosis. We have developed
a whole array of concepts and tools in the field that can be used by parties and
hopefully mutually with some facilitation to analyze the mess that they are in.
That is step one, so that you can then think what kind of competency building or
problem solving processes can help move us out of that so then we have training
in conflict resolution, capacity building. It is an integral part of democracy,
as is consensus building.
We know about these processes, we have principles for effectiveness in these
different areas. We know about third party stuff. We know about mediation, what
I call consultation. We have a sense of that as a theory of practice, a body of
knowledge that helps us be more effective rather than somebody who says I think
I should fly to Sri Lanka and try to help people out. There is a fair amount of
what I call social technology, based first of all on theories of understanding
conflict, but also theories of practice and how you operate that's what the
field has to offer. It would be a shame to see it diffused, spread all over, and
retranslated. In a sense it would lose it's theory, practice, and integrity.
Q: In the intractable case studies that you are looking at now in
this book and others as well, you mentioned Tajikistan, but is there another
case that you find inspirational in your work or in the work of others that you
have studied?
A: Everyone finds what happens in South Africa inspirational. There is a
small slice of that which involved a series of quite unofficial meetings between
high level ANC folks coming unofficially, and people on the other side who were
very well connected to the national government, like people in the Afrikaans
Brotherhood. These were initiated and facilitated by, believe it or not, a
mining company and a business firm with interests who had people in its human
relations department with some expertise to bring folks together and provide a
forum to initiate some discussions that helped pave the way toward negotiations
by building understanding and trust. Obviously many people in South Africa,
especially what was previously the Center for Inter group Relations, did a lot
of work, I don't know the case well, but I know a lot of people did a lot. This
is just one slice but it seems to be an essential slice of how South Africa got
on the road to peace when it did. That is fairly inspirational. We need more.
Q: How do you go from transformation of a group like that, or at least
building empathy within a group like that, to societal transformation or creating
societal empathy. How do scale-up from something that may contain 20 people to a
nation of several million?
A: We don't really have the answer to that question and we don't necessarily
have the scope of expertise to answer that. That's where you need a lot of
people with a lot of professionalism, other experiences, qualifications, people
in mass communication, public opinion, and social movements. You name it. You
see a lot of my work has been focused, and it may not be as much en vogue as it
used to be. It has been focused on what role conflict resolution can play at the
center of things with elites and influentials who are critical at the initial
stages and critical throughout the process, but who are insufficient on their
own. We know that and we acknowledge that.
Then you need to think of ways that the kind of work we do can be done on
other levels, grassroots level, intermediate levels, different sectors, like the
work we did in Cyprus where we worked in business where we worked in health. We
worked in every sector imaginable having people involved, and still do to
diffuse the work in to society at large. To some degree what you need eventually
to do is to change a culture of violence to a culture of peace. That is big time
social change and I don't think that the field has really addressed how tough
that is or how hard it is or hard it is or all the connections. We are not the
only people, obviously, who can and need to be involved in that.
We need to think about the transfer process not just to the official
decision-making, but also to public opinion, different constituencies, interest
groups, and so on through the media. That is one reason why journalists are
often invited to so called problem solving workshops. They will write about and
talk about it. They influence other people, so you want opinion leaders in many
sectors, in many ways to become involved in helping to build a culture of peace.
They are just about always out there waiting, hoping, looking, and trying to do
their thing. All outside parties can do in the field is work to support that
process. It is a very big question.
Q: I just got this image in my head while you were talking of
conciliation and consultation processes functioning almost as lubrication to the
very cogs at the Track I level to move and work together in a sense.
A: I think in a very focused way that is right on. That is what it is about.
Consultation particularly or problem solving workshops or interactive conflict
resolution, however wide a term you want to use. The latter is widest that I
actually came up with in response to the people in the field asking for it at
the time. In a focused way that is about as big as your expectations should be,
that's challenging enough. For me to think about changing societies is quite
frankly a quantum leap. I hope my work makes a small contribution to that, but
to think about doing that boggles my mind and almost paralyzes my will. Of
course you are working in constant with thousands of other people, but at the
same time people in peace building need to be very sober about how tough it is
to move toward a culture of peace in intractable conflicts.
Q: It sounds like it might behoove conflict resolution practitioners to limit
ones expectations with how far they can go with the work they are doing.
A: I think we need to be more modest and humble than the average but I think
to acquire funding and support people make potential claims that they can help
accomplish this and this and this and they are in that direction but if you take
hardnosed social scientist and look at that they would laugh, quite frankly. The
field has to be careful about what it promises.
Q: What advice would you give to someone coming into this field?
A: The first advice I would give somebody starting out is to get a good solid
base in the conceptual foundation and the practice of the field. Advance that
with some skill sets that you can actually offer. At the same time to think
beyond where we are now toward the policy domain, and start thinking about how
the field of conflict resolution, its principles, its practices, its assumptions
that we believe to be true can slowly influence policy makers at both domestic
and also international levels. For them to move in the direction of trying to
bring about a culture of peace in the sense that people look to cooperative
non-violent methods with dealing with their differences. They can build
institutions to do that.
Even the use of violence as a last resort is eliminated, except in situations
where some aggressor chooses to use force. This choice would be way outside what
the vast majority of people in the world would condone or see as acceptable,
that may be seen as an intermediate stage. If human beings don't learn to
respect their differences, and live in cooperative ways, then this human
experiment I don't think is going to survive, quite frankly.
Q: Other advice?
A: The other thing I would say is to try and understand the confusion and the
complexity that the context of peace building and other terms now provide to the
field of conflict resolution. Try to chart way in that where you have a good
sense of what you can do, but you also have a good sense of what you cannot do
but what you obviously have to do in concert with a lot of other people and a
lot of other activities and that's not easy because that clear picture is not
available. I really think that is the current challenge and then within that to
maintain again the theory, practice, and integrity of the field rather than
allowing it to basically be co-opted, compromised, or massaged in ways that take
it away from its true base.
Q: Does an intervener have a responsibility to know what else is
going on out there in order to act in coordination with other interveners?
A: Yes, very much so. Earlier your comment about whose responsibility is
coordination was really an important question that more and more people are
raising right now. Obviously it is not easy, it requires a lot of networking and
interfacing and so on but in a sense that is part of a code of conduct. There
has been some pretty good attempts at codes of conduct that include your usual
ethical practice, but also go beyond that to think of your obligations to the
parties and the wider context and other people who are active in that context
and so on. It is a really big challenge, but I think young people coming in to
the field or older people coming new to the field need to really think about
this as a professional challenge of immense magnitude not to be taken lightly at
all. Even if you come from an existing professional base, which many people do,
as a lawyer, psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, whatever. You then build
upon that when you move into the field of conflict resolution or you will
ultimately fail or do something that is not good.
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